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Abstract
This article explores the possibility that John Dewey’s silence about which democratic
means are needed to achieve democratic ends, while confusing, makes greater sense if
we appreciate the notion of political technology from an anthropological perspective.
Michael Eldridge relates the exchange between John Herman Randall, Jr. and Dewey
in which Dewey concedes “that I have done little or nothing in this direction [of
outlining what constitutes adequate political technology, but that] does not detract
from my recognition that in the concrete the invention of such a technology is the
heart of the problem of intelligent action in political matters.” Dewey’s concession
could be interpreted as an admission that he was unqualified to identify political
machinery or institutions suitable for realizing his vision of democracy as a way of
life. Not being able to specify adequate means to achieve lofty democratic ends is not
problematic, though, if we appreciate the roots of Dewey’s work (especially Human
Nature and Conduct) in the anthropological writings of Immanuel Kant and Franz
Boas. Experience reflects a myriad of social and cultural conditions such that specifying
explicit means to structure that experience risks stymieing the organic development of
political practice. When pressured to operationalize political technology, Dewey chose
the appropriately open-ended and, at times, frustratingly vague means of education
and growth. In short, Dewey did not want his ambitious democratic vision to outstrip
the possibilities of practice, so he left the task of specifying exact political technology
(or which democratic means are best suited to achieve democratic ends) unfinished.
I believe that education is the fundamental method of social progress and
reform.
—John Dewey1
In the broadest sense, it [Dewey’s experimentalism] is the experimentalism
of the anthropologist, of the student of human institutions and cultures,
impressed by the fundamental role of habit in men and societies and by
the manner in which those habits are altered and changed.
—John Herman Randall, Jr.2
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This article explores the possibility that John Dewey’s silence on the matter of
which democratic means are needed to achieve democratic ends, while confusing,
makes greater sense if we appreciate the notion of political technology from an
anthropological perspective. The late Michael Eldridge related the exchange between
John Herman Randall, Jr. and Dewey in which Dewey concedes “that I have done
little or nothing in this direction [of outlining what constitutes adequate political
technology, but that] does not detract from my recognition that in the concrete
the invention of such a technology is the heart of the problem of intelligent action
in political matters.”3
Dewey’s concession could be interpreted as an admission that he was unqualified to identify political machinery or institutions suitable for his vision of democracy as a way of life. Not being able to specify adequate means to achieve lofty
democratic ends is not problematic though, if we appreciate the roots of Dewey’s
work (especially Human Nature and Conduct) in the anthropological writings of
Immanuel Kant and Franz Boas. Experience reflects a myriad of social and cultural
conditions such that specifying explicit means to structure that experience risks
stymieing the organic development of political practice. When pressured to operationalize political technology, Dewey chose the appropriately open-ended—and,
at times, frustratingly vague—means of education and growth. In short, he did
not want his ambitious democratic vision to outstrip the possibilities of practice,
so he left the task of specifying exact political technology (or which democratic
means are best suited to achieve democratic ends) unfinished. The importance of
addressing this issue arises from the fact that much of the secondary literature on
Deweyan democracy misconstrues Dewey’s vagueness about exact political technology as a weakness of his political philosophy, when it is—I argue—its strength.
This article is organized into four sections. In the first, I summarize Eldridge’s
treatment of Dewey’s political technology as well as some work of his critics. These
critics contend that either Dewey specified the wrong democratic means to achieve
democratic ends or he was too agnostic about settling on what technology was
required in advance of changing cultural and political conditions. The second section imagines that political technology is limited to institutions. Dewey’s silence
can then be interpreted as an attempt to maintain a sufficiently flexible institutional
agenda. In the third section, it is argued that the institutionalist perspective proves
incomplete and, therefore, needs to be supplemented with a more robust account.
To this end, I propose that Dewey’s failure to specify adequate political technology makes more sense if appreciated anthropologically, reflecting the importance
Eldridge affords the notion of cultural instrumentalism and that Dewey, himself,
gave to the concept of culture. The article concludes with some implications of my
analysis for Dewey scholarship, generally, including a call for a closer study of the
late Michael Eldridge’s impressive scholarly work on Dewey’s political technology,
and grassroots political activism.
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Dewey and the Problem of Political Technology
The essay “Democratic Ends Need Democratic Means for Their Realization” demonstrates how Dewey’s conceptualization of the means-end relationship operates in a
political context.4 Originally Dewey presented it as an address to the Committee for
Cultural Freedom at the outset of the Second World War and prior to U.S. involvement (1939, Germany had just invaded Poland). In the work, he expressed concern
about the argument, prevalent among elites during the 1930s, that promoting
democracy will at times require the use of non-democratic means or methods, such
as violence, propaganda and torture, in order to secure democratic ends. Dewey
noted that the problem of “repression of cultural freedom” in Germany, Japan
and Italy cannot solely be due to their fascist political systems, but is symptomatic
of defects in the wider culture. Likewise, he claimed that “our chief problems
are those within our own culture.”5 He decried the use of undemocratic means
(e.g., violence, totalitarian rule) for the sake of securing democratic ends. In other
words, the ends do not always justify the means (despite the Jesuit maxim), and
in fact noxious means can potentially poison perfectly acceptable ends. So, “resort
to military force,” he claims, is unjustified in promoting democracy. Instead, we
should employ “democratic methods, methods of consultation, persuasion, negotiation, cooperative intelligence.”6 Moreover, the scope of democratic transformation
should not be restricted to explicitly political arrangements, but ought to extend to
“industry, education—or culture generally”—that is, to the whole of civil society.
Dewey’s definition of democracy is alive with melioristic possibilities, or
opportunities to unleash human potential. In the same year, but in a different
address entitled “Creative Democracy—The Task before Us,” he writes, “Democracy
is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human nature.”7
If democracy cannot be attained by undemocratic means, then what means, methods and instruments are available to the democrat? What did Dewey mean by
intelligent democratic methods? A short answer is technology that is adequate to
achieve democratic ends.
Some possible candidates for what might count as adequate political technology are as follows:
1.
2.

3.

4.

Deliberative forums, such as town hall meetings and citizen assemblies;
Campaign finance reform or efforts to revise current laws that govern how money is contributed to and used by political action groups,
political parties and candidates;
Transparent and accountable regulatory institutions or independent
bodies that stop corruption and ensure proper checks and balances
in a system of fair governance; and
Efforts to expand civic education and extend voting rights to marginalized or disempowered individuals and groups.
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Dewey comes closest to advocating for the first candidate (and to a weaker
extent the last three) in The Public and Its Problems. First, he distinguishes between
political democracy and the social idea of democracy: “We have had occasion to
refer in passing to the distinction between democracy as a social idea and political
democracy as a system of government. The two are, of course, connected. The idea
remains barren and empty save as it is incarnated in human relationships. Yet in discussion they may be distinguished.”8 Next, he defines political democracy as “those
traditional political institutions” which include “general suffrage, elected representatives [and] majority rule.”9 Dewey connects the idea of representative democracy
and the role of experts and government officials to political technology associated
with citizen deliberation. Although Dewey never employs the term deliberation
in the way deliberative democrats do today, he wields synonyms such as inquiry,
dialogue, and communication to describe how citizens enrich democratic practice
through discussion, not simply by voting in elections.10 In The Public and Its Problems, he writes, “Systematic and continuous inquiry . . . and its results are but tools
after all. Their final actuality is accomplished in face-to-face relationships by means
of direct give and take. Logic in its fulfilment recurs to the primitive sense of the
word: dialogue.”11 For Dewey, dialogue is the engine for democratic self-governance,
the public ruling itself, since it ensures that government policies and actions may
be criticized, petitioned, and eventually changed through citizen action. This, he
insists, maximizes government accountability and minimizes the extent to which
citizens will blindly follow state officials. Of course, Dewey acknowledges that officials are important, given their policy expertise and the daunting complexity of
political problems. Ultimately, though, the idea of democracy should outstrip the
state machinery, radiating into all aspects of life: “The idea of democracy is a wider
and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the state at its best. To be realized it must
affect all modes of human association, the family, the school, industry, religion.”12
To make this point more clearly, Dewey abstains from dictating the requisite democratic technology in terms of specific political proposals, reforms, institutions, or practices. All we know is that adequate technology indicates political
means that are properly adapted to the democratic end: namely, citizens realizing
as fully as possible their individual and collective capacities (“the possibilities of
human nature”). So, democratic transformation demands diligence and creativity, “the slow day by day adoption and contagious diffusion in every phase of our
common life of methods that are identical with the ends to be reached.”13 Unfortunately, Dewey does not elaborate further.
Dewey’s vagueness about the exact content of intelligent democratic means
or political technology occupies Michael Eldridge’s attention in chapter four of
his book Transforming Experience. He turns to consider “the question of the adequacy of Dewey’s political technology”—that is, whether the need for intelligent
political practice is no more than an empty truism, given Dewey’s silence about
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the requirements to realize it.14 By failing to specify any requisite political competencies or institutions, Dewey was criticized by his younger colleague at Columbia
University, John Herman Randall, Jr. In the essay “Dewey’s Interpretation of the
History of Philosophy,” Randall quoted several passages of Liberalism and Social
Action in which Dewey called for the reform of inherited institutional arrangements and their outmoded practices through the rigorous application of social
intelligence. Institutional change was needed, but by what method could it be
achieved? Of course, for Dewey, the method is predominantly educational. “Public
agitation, propaganda, legislative and administrative action are effective in producing the change of disposition,” Dewey wrote, “but only in the degree in which
they are educative—that is to say, in the degree in which they modify mental and
moral attitudes.”15 Randall did not criticize Dewey for turning the question of how
to facilitate institutional change into the question of how to educate institutional
change-makers. Rather, he challenged Dewey to identify the competencies that
such a political education should aim to develop in citizens: “Instead of many fine
generalities about the ‘method of cooperative intelligence,’ Dewey might well direct
attention to the crucial problem of extending our political skill. For political skill
can itself be taken as a technological problem to which inquiry can hope to bring
an answer. . . . Thus by rights Dewey’s philosophy should culminate in the earnest
consideration of the social techniques for reorganizing beliefs and behaviours—
techniques very different from those dealing with natural materials. It should issue
in a social engineering, in an applied science of political education—and not merely
in the hope that someday we may develop one.”16
Dewey’s response to Randall was diplomatic—almost to a fault. After thanking Randall for his careful critique, Dewey concedes that his democratic vision begs
for more detail: “The fact—which he points out—that I have myself done little or
nothing in this direction does not detract from my recognition that in the concrete the invention of such a technology is the heart of the problem of intelligent
action in political matters.”17 Dewey’s concession could be damning evidence that
his political ideals were too lofty and his democratic dreams too utopic. Dewey
distinguished political democracy, which signifies the institutional phase of democratic governance, and democracy as a social idea (or way of life), which points to
the conceptual or theoretical phase.18 Several contemporary commentators have
criticized Dewey, similar to Randall, for failing to operationalize, or make concrete,
the meaning of political democracy.19
Roger Ames suggests one reason for Dewey’s silence. Specifying the requisite political skills and institutions for realizing democratic ends, besides being
undemocratic, is potentially dangerous. Superficially democratic means can easily
transform into conservative instruments of state sanctioned violence. Ames writes,
“On Dewey’s understanding, the familiar institutionalized forms of democracy—a
constitution, the office of president, the polling station, the ballot box, and so
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on—far from being a guarantee of political order, can indeed become a source of
just such coercion.”20 For instance, Dewey could have recommended a procedure
for amending a state’s constitution, one that is especially difficult to attain, on the
rationale that it will sustain political order and continuity from one generation to
the next. However, when the effect is to preserve a morally questionable constitutional provision (for instance, one that sustained practices of racial segregation),
the constitutional provision converts to an undemocratic means or piece of political technology. Another problem with an individual (such as Dewey) determining
what constitutes appropriate political technology in advance of democratic publics
is that the resulting redefinition of genuine political culture prevents democratic
growth. The ruling or elite culture becomes identical to political culture überhaupt,
thereby foreclosing opportunities for social experimentation, popular criticism,
and grassroots dissidence.21 So, it appears that Dewey’s move to demote political
democracy relative to the aspirational ideal of democracy was warranted, given
that the recommendation of absolute or fixed means is confining, tradition-bound,
and potentially coercive.
While Ames offers one explanation for Dewey’s silence on the matter of political technology, he does not tell us why Dewey would not postulate a set of intelligent political practices that, while tentatively democratic and fallible in light of
future inquiries, could nevertheless inform political experiments aimed at achieving democratic ends. One approach, as we will be seen in the next section, is to
describe Dewey as an institutionally oriented democratic theorist with an openended institutional agenda—that is, to appreciate Dewey’s political technology, or
lack thereof, from an institutionalist perspective.22
Another approach is to understand democratic means as culturally contingent and emergent phenomena, evoking similar notions in the work of Immanuel Kant and Franz Boas. I suggest that this approach works best if we appreciate
Dewey’s reasons for not specifying adequate political technology from an anthropological perspective.

From an Institutional Perspective
Institutions consist of funded beliefs and habits—what organizational theorists call
organizational culture—the accretion of which have created objective organizations
and agencies that persist in space and time.23 According to Dewey, “[t]o say . . .
[something] is institutionalized is to say that it involves a tough body of customs,
ingrained habits of actions, organized and authorized standards, and methods
of procedure.”24 So, ideas and ideals do not exhaust political experience; for their
meaning to be suitably enriched, they should also manifest in stable political forms.
However, ideals qualify the stability of institutional forms, permitting them to
organically develop through critical scrutiny and reform.25 While Dewey acknowledges that successful “institutions . . . are stable and enduring,” their stability is
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“only relatively fixed” because “they constitute the structure of the processes that
go on . . . and are not forced upon processes from without.”26 In Hegel’s philosophy
of right,27 the dialectical opposition between intellect and sense gradually transforms into self-consciousness and social institutions from a raw physical world;
ultimately, they are reconciled in the Absolute, where “the real is rational, and the
rational is real.” Although Dewey’s Hegel-influenced pragmatism dispenses with
the Absolute, it retains a concern for how ideas and ideals directly influence the
growth of those habit-funded processes called institutions.28
An emphasis on institutions does not preclude a concern for individuals,
though. Indeed, personal development is, for Dewey, a precondition for institutional
development, for “individuals who are democratic in thought and action are the
sole final warrant for the existence and endurance of democratic institutions.”29
So as not to pre-emptively foreclose the many possible avenues before us, Dewey
purposely avoided recommending a set of institutional arrangements or a final
destination in the quest to realize a better form of democracy. In stark contrast,
Francis Fukuyama declares that, by the latter half of the twentieth-century, “the
end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western
liberal democracy as the final form of human government” had been reached. Rather
than advocate for “political democracy” or a discrete set of political institutions (in
Fukuyama’s case, liberal democratic ones), Dewey proposed a set of leading principles or postulations that together are termed the “social idea” of democracy.30 As
postulations, these ideas are intended to direct subsequent investigations into the
design of a stable and viable governing apparatus; however, taken alone, they have
no direct correspondence with any particular set of institutions.31
Dewey understands democracy as an open-ended struggle to achieve an
emancipatory ideal which enriches individual and communal experience. Although
“the measure of the worth of any social institution” is usually its “limited and more
immediately practical” consequences, what the measure should be, Dewey insists,
is “its effect in enlarging and improving experience.”32 Realizing the ideal (i.e., the
social idea of democracy) therefore requires institutional change. However, Dewey
does not presume to know—let alone recommend—the content of that institutional
change in advance of its determination by the people and institutions of actual
political democracies (e.g., elections, commissions of inquiry, judicial decisions,
and regulatory agency rulings). Generating social and political reforms demands
institutional transformation. However, the instrumentalities of change should
not be preordained by a philosopher. According to David Waddington, Dewey
“refuse[d] to specify the shape of social change in advance. If social change is to be
truly democratic, it needs to be placed in the hands of the demos, in the hands of
the workers and citizens who will actually make the change.”33 Specifying the right
political-institutional technology to obtain social change would block opportunities
for citizens to develop competencies through their own participation in the process.
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Whether eliminating apartheid in South Africa or ameliorating racial injustice in the Southern United States, change begs for experimentation with alternate
institutions. James Campbell contends that pragmatist policy-making should
resemble an open-ended experimental program: “[A]ll policy measures should
be envisioned as experiments to be tested in their future consequences. As a consequence of this testing, the program will undergo ongoing revision.”34 Likewise,
Dewey writes, “[t]hinking ends in experiment and experiment is an actual alteration of a physically antecedent situation in those details or respects which called
for thought in order to do away with some evil [or problem].”35 Given the experimental thrust of institutional makeovers, long-term consequences are often uncertain, even to those who initiate them. As Dewey observes, “the great social changes
which have produced new social institutions have been the cumulative effect of flank
movements that were not obvious at the time of their origin.”36 Likewise, pragmatist
theorizing about political institutions could, either intentionally or inadvertently,
contribute to these “flank movements” that beget institutional change.
Indeed, there is some circumstantial historical evidence for this, such as
the immense influence Dewey and other classic American pragmatists’ ideas had
on the Progressive movement of the early twentieth-century; and, more recently,
some of the language and concepts of contemporary pragmatism that seeped into
Barack Obama’s campaign for political change.37 If they continue on this trajectory,
it would appear that pragmatists might have their ideas and ideals realized in the
design of new institutions and the reconstruction of old ones. Of course, there is
also the risk that these pragmatist ideas and ideals will be diluted or distorted in
the process of becoming institutionalized.38
Whatever the outcome of specific institutional recommendations, the marriage of institutionalism and pragmatism appears to resolve the political technology
conundrum. From an institutionalist perspective, Dewey’s silence on the matter
of political technology is excusable. He was an institutionalist without a specific
institutional agenda. He simply refused to specify the right institutional make-up
in advance, so as not to foreclose opportunities for genuine experimentation and
democratic choice.

From an Anthropological Perspective
When pragmatists become institutionalists, a closer association between political
theory and practice is forged. However, the institutionalist perspective falls short
of addressing the political technology problem for at least two reasons. One, Dewey
still cannot respond to the objection that some set of experimental and fallible democratic means must be proposed if we are to have any hope of achieving democratic
ends. As he famously declared, “[p]hilosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a
device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men.”39 Dewey’s silence on
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the feasibility of particular institutional methods might be interpreted as a failure
to address “the problems of men,” an unwillingness to grapple with the practical
obstacles institutional actors would face in implementing his vision of democracy.
Two, democratic means are not exhausted by institutions, but extend downwards
to even more tertiary tools and micro-level behaviors—specifically, to the political
practices of agents who sometimes stand outside traditional institutional settings.
For instance, political activists make demands on policymakers in ways that do not
always involve formal petition, but extend to informal techniques, such as direct
action and agitation. To call those techniques institutions would be a misnomer
since the rationale for enacting them is that more traditional, institutionalized
channels of redress have been exhausted. To deny political status to such activist
techniques would be equally mistaken. If voice cannot be exercised in a traditional
institutionalized setting, oftentimes the only alternative for the silenced or marginalized minority is to exit and resort to more radical means of political persuasion.
So, how do we understand Dewey’s reluctance to specify exact political technology in a way that does not offend his concern with addressing the “problems of
men” and accommodates the practices of political activists? A clue can be found
in John Hermann Randall’s comment that in “the broadest sense,” Dewey’s experimentalism “is the experimentalism of the anthropologist.”40 Late in life, Dewey
expressed regret that he had not substituted the anthropological language of “culture” for “experience” in his landmark work Experience and Nature (1925):
The name “culture” in its anthropological . . . sense designates the vast
range of things experienced in an indefinite variety of ways. It possesses
as a name just that body of substantial references which “experience” as a
name has lost. It names artifacts which rank as “material” and operations
upon and with material things. [. . .] “culture” designates, also in their reciprocal inter-connections, that immense diversity of human affairs, interests, concerns, values which compartmentalists pigeonhole under “religion,” “aesthetics,” “politics,” “economics,” etc., etc. Instead of separating,
isolating, and insulating the many aspects of common life, “culture” holds
them together in their human and humanistic unity—a service which “experience” has ceased to render.”41

Dewey’s preference for culture over experience signals not only a cultural turn in
his writings, but also an anthropological turn. Culture is a more inclusive concept
than experience, encompassing all those artifacts, ideas, and practices that make
human life meaningful—including those conventionally bracketed under the headings “political” or “institutional.” Taking an anthropological perspective is one
way to sidestep the tendency among theorists to compartmentalize. To this end, I
briefly examine the influence of Franz Boas ‘and Immanuel Kant’s anthropological writings on Dewey’s views about culture, especially as they were expressed in
Human Nature and Conduct, before returning to the main question of this inquiry:
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How might we explain Dewey’s silence about what constitutes adequate political
technology without offending his concern with the “problems of men,” and all the
while accommodating the activities of political activists?
Franz Boas’ and Dewey’s tenures at Columbia University not only overlapped, but their correspondence reveals a degree of mutual intellectual influence
beyond that of casual colleagues. In The Mind of Primitive Man, Boas dispelled
the then-widespread presumption that racial differences were innate. Evidence
suggested that these essentialized physical and cognitive differences reflected environmental and social differences instead.42 Boas writes that “the variability in
each racial unit is great. The almost insurmountable difficulty lies in the fact that
physiological and psychological processes and particularly personality cannot be
reduced to an absolute standard that is free of environmental elements. It is therefore gratuitous to claim that a race has a definite personality.”43 And elsewhere, he
notes “that many so-called racial or hereditary traits are to be considered rather as
a result of early exposure to certain forms of social conditions.”44 In a speech before
the NAACP, Dewey would lean on Boas’ findings in making his own argument
against the view that racial differences are inherent.45
For Dewey and Boas, probably the most astounding area of intellectual
confluence is their similar accounts of habits and the process of habituation. Boas
writes, “The facts indicate that habits may modify structure . . . [which] suggests
an instability of habits much greater than that of bodily form.”46 Human and nonhuman animals can overcome their hereditary limitations in the struggle to adapt
to novel environmental conditions. The secret to adaptation is the development of
new habits, which while more radical or unstable than an individual’s morphology,
can in time alter the habit-guided creature’s bodily features. Where human behavior
differs from non-human animal behavior is in the capacity to operate outside
the range of “stereotyped” instincts, to engage in practice that “depends on local
tradition and is learned.”47 In other words, habit formation in humans is tied to
the perpetuation of culture, specifically the transference of traditions and localized
knowledge through education. For Dewey, similar to Boas, what distinguishes
humans from non-human animals is the capacity to develop intelligent habits and
transmit cultural capital through the medium of education. According to Dewey,
education is a “process of forming fundamental dispositions” or habits so that they
“take effect in conduct.”48
Besides the work of Boas, Dewey’s views also found some inspiration in the
anthropological writings of Immanuel Kant. Though Dewey was a regular critic
of Kant (and his reading of Kant’s work was distinctly Hegelian), his familiarity
with Kant’s opus is beyond question. Indeed, he wrote his lost doctoral dissertation on Kant’s philosophical method and the problem of the external world.49
In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant considers the obstacles to
rational self-management. In the first section (titled “Anthropological Didactic”),

E&C

Education and Culture

Dewey’s Political Technology

39

he addresses the psychological impediments, and in the second (“Anthropological
Characteristic”), the physical and social hurdles to exercising reason in all areas
of practical life.50 Unlike Boas and Dewey, Kant propounded an essentialized theory of racial differences. He catalogued a list of these differences in the final part
of the second section titled “The Character of the Species.” To the book’s credit,
though, education factors feature strongly in the account of how humans rationally
organize their individual and collective lives, controlling the will to act on their
baser nature by becoming “educated to the good.”51 Unlike Dewey, Kant specifies
exactly what political technology is required in order to attain this higher level of
rational self-control. The recipe of political means for Kant is distinctly Republican: moral pedagogy, natural or non-dogmatic religion, and a civic constitution.
With these instrumentalities, Kant believed that German culture could be brought
into alignment with the dictates of reason and morality—or more plainly, with
the requirements of Republican freedom. On at least the point that our notions of
freedom, rationality and moral rightness are a function of culture, Dewey agreed
with Kant.52 For instance, in Freedom and Culture (1939), he writes that the “problem of freedom and of democratic institutions is tied up with the kind of culture
that exists.”53
However, Dewey disagreed with Kant that German culture would reach its
zenith with the adoption of these three Republican political technologies. Earlier,
in German Philosophy and Politics, Dewey accused Kant and German thinkers,
generally, of advancing absolutist philosophies that deny the influence of culture,
block the way toward social experimentation, and produce the conditions for statism and nationalism.54 Likewise, as mentioned earlier, in “Democratic Ends Need
Democratic Means for Their Realization” (1939), Dewey complained that the problem of “repression of cultural freedom” in Germany is not solely attributable to
their fascist political system, but to their larger culture of absolutism, universalism,
and strict obedience to a sense of moral duty at all costs.55 While Dewey disputed
whether Kant’s recipe of political means (moral education, natural religion, and
a civic constitution) had produced Republican freedom in Germany, he largely
accepted Kant’s argument in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Largescale political reforms demand similarly wide-ranging changes in a society’s culture.
Nevertheless, Dewey, unlike Kant, remained reluctant to specify what constitutes
adequate political technology for realizing that change.
A further clue as to why Dewey was silent on the matter of political technology
can be found in Human Nature and Conduct (1922), particularly in his treatment
of habits. Dewey defines habit as “a way or manner of action, not a particular act or
deed.”56 From a physiological perspective, habits resemble bodily functions, such
as taking a breath or digesting food: “Breathing is an affair of the air as truly as of
the lungs; digesting an affair of food as truly of tissues of the stomach.”57 From an
ecological perspective, habits implicate more than an organism’s body. Since a habit
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is a mode of conduct, not the conduct itself, habits also signify ways of adapting
to an environment, not just the adaptations themselves. Habit-guided organismenvironment interaction is not just a matter of an agent acting on a world, but
of an organism behaving within and through a living system, executing its daily
functions as part of a larger web of biotic relations. According to Tom Burke,
the “basic picture, generally speaking, is that of a given organism/environment
system performing a wide range of operations as a normal matter of course.”58
Whether within a simple biological system or complex social one, environmental
disruptions stimulate efforts by organisms to restore equilibrium, to synchronize
their (functionally defined) internal and external environments (what process
biologist call ‘homeostasis’) and to subsequently adapt to environing conditions
through habit-guided adjustments.
From an anthropological perspective, habitual conduct is social through
and through, a matter of generating the proper conditions for intelligent political
action. Dewey writes, “We must work on the environment not merely on the hearts
of men. To think otherwise is to suppose that flowers can be raised in a desert or
motor cars run in a jungle. Both things can happen and without a miracle. But only
by first changing the jungle and desert.”59 To generate genuine political change,
reformers must raise popular consciousness about problems and proposed solutions. In Dewey’s words, they need to “work . . . on the hearts of men.” However,
to ignite a virtuous cycle, they must do more than simply reform the technology
of change (changing the furniture, so-to-speak); they also need to transform the
cultural and environmental conditions under which intelligent habits take form
(“changing the jungle and the desert”). Predetermining the content of that political change, or specifying the exact political technology in advance, cuts the chord
between habits and action, modes of conduct and the conduct itself, generating
the action or conduct but not the reformist impulse that delivers us to intelligent
reformist habits again and again. Thus, education is one of the few forms of political technology Dewey goes to any significant length to elaborate, for it is itself an
open-ended process of forming good inclinations to action, enriching cooperative
experience, and transmitting ideas from one generation to the next. Rather than
perfectly anticipate outcomes (whether in terms of political institutions or practices),
education provides the environmental and cultural conditions for cultivating those
habits that lead individuals to engage in collective action—now and later. One way
to suss out this conclusion is by distinguishing between political technologies and
habits. 60 However, I believe that this path is unproductive because, as mentioned,
political institutions are funded habits, so that the distinction ultimately turns out
to be one without a difference. Educating for political action is a perfectly Deweyan
interpretation of what constitutes adequate political technology within a thriving
democratic society.
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Conclusion
To conclude, I would like to return to the late Michael Eldridge’s perspective on the
matter of Dewey’s silence about political technology by first discussing his commentary on the work of Randy Shaw and, lastly, by stating why we should make a
closer study of this important scholar’s work.
Eldridge elaborated on why Dewey’s notion of political technology encompasses political activism. In Transforming Experience, he turns to Randy Shaw’s
work The Activist’s Handbook as a resource for expanding Dewey’s conception of
political technology and responding to John Herman Randall’s critique. Shaw, a
law student and low-income housing activist, describes his general approach to
organizing in a Deweyan spirit.61 In Eldridge’s words, Shaw’s approach dictates that
“activists should not just react to crises, but use them to organize strategically.”62 As
a reflective practitioner, Shaw illustrates in a series of case studies how this approach
guides individuals in their organized efforts to promote social justice—whether
through strategically planning, assessing politicians’ actions (and promised for
actions), collaborating with adjacent organizations, initiating legal action, or agitating authorities.63 With the help of Shaw and Dewey, Eldridge explains how political
technology operates on the street level: “Many advocates for social justice start with
a rationally generated ideal and demand that an existing situation be replaced by
one that conforms to their ideal.64 Dewey, who was not without his ideals, would
seem to side with political operatives, the political ‘pragmatists,’ in requiring that
any suggested change take the existing situation into account and work from there.
One moves the current practice toward an ideal, modifying both situation and ideal
as needed, through a process of deliberative change.” In other words, political technologies and democratic ideals must be adapted to the conditions of the situation
and the objectives of the present inquiry, a truism that political operatives live by
and Dewey respected as a constraint on his own political philosophy.
Eldridge’s elaboration of Dewey’s answer to Randall in terms of Shaw’s recommendations for social justice activists is helpful insofar as it operationalizes what
Dewey might have meant by adequate political technology. Moreover, it does so
from an anthropological perspective. Eldridge treats Deweyan political technology as a form of cultural practice and habitual activity, both in “the way action is
organized” and “the publicly available symbolic forms through which people experience and express meaning.”65 I strongly believe that Eldridge’s scholarly work, his
legacy, is worthy of close attention and inquiry by pragmatists and Dewey scholars
today. His own writings on Dewey’s historical engagements, pragmatic political
activism, Obama’s pragmatism and the many meanings of pragmatism, to name
only a few topics, demonstrate rigor, honesty, and acumen that are rare.66 Eldridge
was also a scholar-teacher who continually challenged others, pressing them to ask
uncomfortable questions about Dewey’s life and work—not just to idolize the historical figure, but to criticize, improve, and extend his ideas in meaningful ways.67
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